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Abstract 
 
The big question that pervades debate between techno-optimists and their detractors is whether 
social media are good for democracy. Do they help to produce or accelerate democratic change 
or, alternatively, might they hinder it? This article foregrounds an alternative perspective, 
arguing that individual social networking applications likely do not fulfil a single political 
function across national contexts. Their functionality may be mediated instead by language and 
by pre-existing relationships between the state and offline domestic media. We arrive at this 
conclusion through examining reactions on Twitter to two fatal events that occurred in early 
2015: the death in suspicious and politically charged circumstances of the special prosecutor 
Alberto Nisman in Argentina, and the murder in Russia of opposition activist Boris Nemtsov. 
Several similarities between the two deaths facilitate a comparative analysis of the discourses 
around them in the Spanish-language and Russian-language Twitter spheres respectively. In 
Russia, a hostile social media environment polluted by high levels of automated content and 
other spam reduced the utility of Twitter for opposition voices working against an increasingly 
authoritarian state. In Argentina, a third-wave democracy, Twitter discourses appeared as 
predominantly coextensive with other pro-government and opposition online, print, and 
broadcast fora, thus consolidating and amplifying a highly polarized and repetitive wider public 
political conversation. Despite the potential for social media to help citizens circumvent 
restrictions to discursive participation in national public spheres, in both cases compared here 
language environment and domestic political structures contribute significantly to determining 
the uses and limitations of online spaces for expressing opinion on current affairs stories 
involving the state.  
 
Introduction  
In the early hours of 18 January 2015 Natalio Alberto Nisman was found dead of a gunshot to 
the head in his apartment in the exclusive Puerto Madero district of Buenos Aires. Nisman, a 
51-year-old special prosecutor, had risen to public prominence in Argentina during his decade-
long investigation into the bomb attack on 18 July 1994 on the headquarters of the Asociación 
Mutual Israelita de Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community centre in downtown Buenos Aires, 
that killed 85 people and injured a further 300. Although substantial evidence implicates high-
level Iranian officials and agents of the Islamist militant group Hezbollah in the crime, the case 
remains unresolved (Government Printing Office, n.d.). In late 2004, President Néstor Kirchner 
(2003–2007) of the then centre-leftist Frente para la Victoria (FpV) division of the Peronist 
Party declared the failed investigation a ‘national disgrace’ (“Flashback,” 2003), and gave 
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responsibility for resolving the case to Nisman, then a mid-career lawyer rising through the 
ranks of the federal justice system. On 20 January 2015 Nisman was scheduled to present 
evidence before the Argentine National Congress in a closed session, where he intended to 
implicate Cristina Fernández, the President of Argentina and widow of Kirchner, for helping to 
cover up the alleged role of Iran in the bombing (“Incógnitas que surgen,” 2015). Fernández 
vigorously denied the claims (Goñi, 2015). 
 
Less than six weeks later, late on 27 February 2015, Boris Nemtsov was shot dead with four 
bullets to the back as he walked across the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge in Moscow, steps 
from the Kremlin. His assailants shot him with a pistol from a moving car. The investigative 
trace currently appears to lead to Chechnya (Bullough, 2015). Nemtsov, a 55-year-old trained 
physicist, had served as former deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation (1997–1998) 
under Boris Yeltsin. He had gained notoriety in Russia as a principal economic reformer of the 
1990s when, coeval with the introduction of free market economics, price liberalization and the 
wide-scale privatization of former state enterprises, political corruption and crony capitalism 
became de facto norms of elite political conduct. Under the premiership of Vladimir Putin 
(2000–2008, 2012–), Nemtsov fell from the national prominence that he had previously enjoyed 
but continued to push an anti-corruption agenda, if now from a non-governmental and, in the 
heavily censored Russian public information infrastructure, sidelined position. He nonetheless 
remained active in PARNAS, (People's Freedom Party), and had played a public role in 
organizing a large-scale opposition rally in Moscow scheduled for 1 March 2015. On the day of 
his murder, Nemtsov had given a radio interview in which he called for democratic elections in 
Russia and revealed that he was compiling a dossier presenting evidence of Russian military 
activity in Ukraine, despite official claims to the contrary. 
 
Several biographical and circumstantial details provide further parallels between the two men 
and their otherwise-unrelated deaths. Beyond their roles as oppositional provocateurs in heavily 
polarized domestic political landscapes, Nisman and Nemtsov were Jewish in countries with 
long histories of politically mobilizing anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitic trope would re-emerge, 
to one or another degree, in online and offline spaces in the wake of both fatalities. In the days 
and weeks before their deaths, both men expressed fear for their life to family and friends, 
comments that reveal an acute sense that contemporary political activism in their respective 
countries carried fatal risk. Few facts publicly surfaced surrounding the circumstances and 
possible perpetrators of the deaths, creating deep senses of uncertainty among the Argentine 
and Russian citizenry.  
 
Perhaps substituting for these public information deficits, multiple narratives, including 
numerous conspiracy theories, emerged in Russia and Argentina to account for the unknowns 
and to attempt to invest the deaths with singular political meaning (see Zaretsky, 2015, p. 121 
for the varied theories that arose in Argentina; Young, 2015 for Russia). In Russia, the conflict 
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took place against the backdrop of the war in eastern Ukraine, a context all the more acute 
because Anna Duritskaya, Nemtsov's girlfriend, is Ukrainian. Ukrainian nationalist accounts 
created the bulk of material critical of Putin, the official investigation, and the state of Russian 
democracy. Argentine and Russian officials alike advanced conspiracy-type narratives, 
providing almost identical theories of provocation. In a speech published on social media 
channels and her official website, Fernández described Nisman’s death, as an ‘operation against 
the Government’ (“AMIA and prosecutor,” 2015). Putin described the murder of Nemtsov as 
bearing ‘all the signs of a provocation’, and his press spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, labelled the 
murder an attempt to discredit the Kremlin (Luhn, 2015). The pro-Kremlin press was keen to 
draw a comparison between the two fatalities, arguing that both deaths were designed to 
besmirch the respective presidents (e.g. “Mukhin: Ubiistvo Nemtsova,” 2015). In Argentina, 
contrastingly, opposition voices decried the deaths of Nemtsov and Nisman alike as the result 
of ‘corrupt power’ (Guyot, 2015).  
 
In both cases, many of the discourses surrounding the political deaths were propagated in online 
spaces. A maelstrom of polemical, informational and emotional reactions on social media 
platforms including Facebook, Twitter and Tumblr quickly developed. In the Nisman case, 
communication on Twitter, the microblogging platform, intervened and shaped political events, 
as the media and state jostled for the upper hand: the journalist Damián Pachter broke the story 
on Twitter. He fled to Israel soon after, suspecting that the Secretaría de Inteligencia (the 
Argentine secret intelligence service) were monitoring his movements at close-range (Pachter, 
2015). The Argentine presidential office, the Casa Rosada, also published its first statements on 
the death on Twitter. Furthermore, on 27 January, the official Casa Rosada Twitter account 
published Pachter’s flight details, including an apparent return ticket to Buenos Aires for 4 days 
later (“Reporter Who Broke,” 2015), as evidence that he did not really fear the state. Twitter 
clearly functioned not only as a forum in which to document and comment on the death and its 
aftermath, but also a force driving subsequent events. 
 
The parities between the two cases provide the conditions for a comparative analysis of the 
Russian and Spanish-language discourses that emerged on Twitter to account for the deaths of 
Nisman and Nemtsov respectively. We thus contribute to the still minimal literature that looks 
beyond Anglophone content in its analysis of the political affordances of Twitter.
1
 Did Twitter 
facilitate broad participation and a diversity of content, as normative theories of the democratic 
public sphere would hope? Focusing on the ‘Nisman’ and ‘Nemtsov’ hashtags (henceforth 
#Nisman and #Nemtsov), we tackle this question through an analysis of volume of tweets, 
levels of artifice, and participant identity. To begin, we highlight the role that public discourses 
surrounding murder cases have historically played in expanding participation in the public 
sphere and consequently contributing to processes of democratisation. We then trace the shifts 
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and stagnations in the political affordances of such discourses as they emerge and circulate in 
the Twittersphere. 
 
Discourses of Political Murder, Democratization and the Internet 
Political murder tends to be understood as the acme of an expulsive violence that has no place 
in the inclusionary agenda of democratic politics. Yet, the public activities and debates that 
such fatal acts occasion have sometimes been read in a contrasting light: as part of democratic 
consolidation, or a sign of democratic maturity. In twentieth-century Mexico, where murder 
consistently occupied central thematic space in the national public sphere, it has even been 
suggested that ‘critical exchanges’ surrounding homicides were ‘key to the process of 
incorporation and democratization’ (Piccato, 2014, p. 323). If applied more broadly, this view 
risks overshadowing the censorship and culture of fear that has muted discussion of numerous 
political murders, but it nonetheless brings to attention an important, if overlooked, 
epiphenomenon of a selection of politically charged cases.  
 
A more broadly applicable argument emerges once we perceive discourses surrounding 
political murder to reinforce democracy, rather than as a critical aspect of it. In various mid-to-
late-twentieth-century contexts, political murders, including those targeting opposition figures, 
opened up public discursive spaces to competing and interacting viewpoints. Scholars have 
observed that, in the wake of a political homicide, the press sometimes facilitated this 
pluralizing process by incorporating a wider spectrum of voices than was usual outside the 
bounds of these extraordinary events (Piccato, 2014). Political murder cases also sometimes 
motivated citizens to look beyond media channels in order to communicate with political 
authorities, to express their sentiments regarding the fatality, and to contest the official 
narratives surrounding it. Citizens of diverse nationalities have publicly demonstrated their 
outrage at political murders by protesting; writing open letters (Ben-Yehuda, 2000); launching 
international campaigns, sometimes aided by national and transnational human rights 
organizations (Schmidli, 2013); and through memorialization designed to maintain public 
awareness of political murders and their lack of resolution after the media buzz abated (Bilbija 
& Payne, 2011). In each of these cases, political murder has stimulated participation in the 
public sphere, or the ‘theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk’ (Fraser, 1990, p. 57). In so far as many normative theories of the 
public sphere consider broad discursive participation to be vital to democracy (including 
Avritzer 2009; Ferree, 2002; Fraser, 1990), these discursive interventions have both redrawn 
the outer limits of participation in national discourse and consequently contributed to 
democratic achievement and consolidation. 
 
If in the late twentieth century political murders sometimes fomented exceptional national 
discursive participation, what impact might social media have on deliberative processes 
surrounding political murder in the twenty-first century? As Jurgen Gerhards and Mike S. 
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Schäfer (2010, p. 145) have observed, a number of expectations surround the potential political 
affordances of the Internet: in particular, it is ‘expected that alternative evaluations and 
interpretations will be presented online’, and that the information available online will show 
greater variety. There is also an expectation that, over time, ‘the Internet might democratize the 
public sphere and lead to strengthened political interest and participation among citizens’. 
 
An extensive literature probes this putative link between democratisation and online forms of 
communication. In the late 1990s, Froomkin asserted that the Internet might redress a power 
imbalance between private and state actors by allowing the former to subvert domestic 
regulation by channelling communication through international platforms. Irrespective of 
location, citizens could send and receive anonymous messages, making censorship 
unenforceable. Consequently, Froomkin argued, the structure of the Internet would ‘promote 
liberal democratic values of openness and freedom.’ (Froomkin, 1997). This ‘optimistic’ view 
was tempered by Kalathil and Boas (2003), who outlined various ways authoritarian states 
could adapt the network in ways serving their own priorities and interests, for instance by 
creating ‘business-friendly but politically sanitized Internet infrastructure’ (Kalathil & Boas, 
2003, pp. 136, 152). 
 
The debate on the democratic virtues of the Internet was re-run in the wake of the Arab Spring, 
now between parties caricatured as cyber-utopians and cyber-sceptics. Larry Diamond (2010) 
coined the term ‘liberation technologies’ to characterise Web 2.0 applications such as Twitter 
and Facebook. Because authoritarian regimes restrict media freedom, any technology that 
reduces the costs of accessing independent news will increase the likelihood that citizens 
encounter information that might prompt them to participate in activity directed against the 
regime. Similarly, by allowing decentralised coordination and direct communication between 
individuals, social media applications lowered barriers to collective action (Shirky, 2009). 
Cyber-sceptics such as Evgeny Morozov (2010) asserted that the Internet enabled mass 
surveillance and therefore strengthened authoritarian rule. He also drew attention to ways that 
officials used social media both to disseminate pro-government views, and to identify hostile 
citizens. As the euphoria of the Arab Spring has faded, evidence has mounted that the Internet 
may not in itself intimidate authoritarian rulers. Quantitative data analysed by Rød and 
Weidmann (2015, p.2) indicates that the more oppressive authoritarian regimes are the more 
likely they are ‘to support the Internet’, a finding they read as showing that autocrats both 
realise the prospects for surveillance afforded by new technology, and are aware of the potential 
for technology to create and maintain ‘a tightly controlled sphere of public opinion’. 
 
A consensus has begun to emerge that social media may help facilitate both mobilisation and 
coordination, which provides citizens with more opportunities to engage in political discourse 
(Badr & Demmelhuber, 2014, p.149). However, evidence that social media expose users to 
views that challenge their perceptions is less clear-cut. Tewksbury et al. (2001) argued that the 
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dynamic nature of the web means individuals browsing the internet are accidentally exposed to 
new information, e.g. through breaking news headlines. Today, people frequently access a 
range of news content mediated through social network newsfeeds, and framed by their friends’ 
commentaries. The network structure, it is argued, exposes individuals to a more diverse set of 
news, which increases the likelihood that they will stumble across critical material, for instance 
outlining electoral fraud (Dimitrova, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, 2011; Mullainathan & 
Shleifer, 2005). That said, algorithmic filtering of the kind implemented by Facebook means 
newsfeeds are composed of content a user has a high probability of interacting with, as 
determined by a user’s previous browsing habits. Consequently, users are largely shown what 
they want to see. Selectivity is also a feature on Twitter, though to a lesser degree. A user’s 
newsfeed consists of an unfiltered stream of recent content, but users choreograph the selection 
of accounts contributing to their newsfeed. They can thus avoid content oppositional to their 
own views. However, accidental exposure is more likely on Twitter. The lists of nationally and 
regionally trending topics can facilitate accidental exposure as it allows users to encounter 
political information, if it is already popular, without actively searching for it. And by clicking 
on a hashtag, the user can explore material on any subject, posted by anyone. Despite the 
freedom to select which content to engage or circumvent, then, the Twitter model means a user 
is more likely to stumble across unsolicited political information on Twitter than on some other 
social media.
2
 
 
The Reach of Twitter in Argentina and Russia 
Argentina and Russia occupy similar positions in rankings of Internet penetration (59.9% and 
61.4% respectively. See: World Bank, n.d.), but Twitter usage is three times higher in 
Argentina than Russia, where domestic social media platforms remain more popular. In 
absolute terms, though, the number of Twitter users is similar: roughly 4.8 million Argentineans 
visit the platform every month compared to about 5.7 million Russians (Schoonderwoerd, 
2013). Although Twitter attracts a broad age range, its key market in the US, as in Russia and 
Argentina, is 18-29 (Schoonderwoerd, 2013). Our analysis may therefore also shed light on the 
online discursive strategies that various stakeholders employ to engage and shape the political 
opinions of first-time and other young voters. 
 
An extensive literature explores Russian political Internet usage, from the late 1990s when the 
Web proved an effective medium for disseminating compromising material about political 
opponents (see Chapter 5: The Internet in Russia in Zasurskii, 2004), to recent studies of social 
media usage during the abortive Snow Revolution of 2011-12 (Oates, 2013), and the 
increasingly hostile online environment following the Crimean conflict (Fredheim, 2015). As 
early as 2001 the BBC described Putin’s campaign website for the March 2000 presidential 
elections as ‘stylish’, and emphasised that the Russian secret services had used hackers during 
the Second Chechen War (Mulvey, 2001). The Medvedev interregnum (2008-2012) saw the 
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President launch his own videoblog; in 2010 he hailed an era of “direct democracy” and cajoled 
government officials and regional governors into maintaining an online presence (Gorham, 
2014). The bulk of scholarship about the Russian internet has focused on media freedom within 
the context of a democratic transition. The Berkman Center’s Russian project has analysed 
Russian cyberspace and social media usage, while the journal Digital Icons, edited by Vlad 
Strukov, explores the interface between the digital and all areas of political and public life in 
Russia, Eurasia and Central Europe. 
Internet usage in Argentina averages more than 4 hours per day, higher than for citizens of 
almost all other countries (Kemp, 2015). Political usage has been evident since at least the 
presidential elections of 2003, when presidential candidates first experimented with online 
campaigning.
3
 Social media exploded as a space for political communications and public 
political deliberation in 2008, when a set of political catchphrases and the names of candidates 
for presidential and other offices rose to mass usage. Political catchphrases trended on Twitter, 
with Fernández and her FpV party’s slogan #Fuerza (Strength) rising to particular prominence 
(Dominguez, 2012, p. 85).  
Despite broad access and intensive usage, and in contrast to the Russian case, scant scholarly 
literature analyses the use of social media, or Internet activity more broadly, in Argentina. The 
available literature predominantly examines domestic journalism online, or state-media online 
interactions. Argentina is not alone in the limited attention afforded to the political uses of 
online spaces. As Sebastian Valenzuela (2013, p.2) notes, ‘most data on social media and 
protest behavior have been collected in either mature democracies or authoritarian regimes’, 
with little attention afforded to ‘the special case of third wave democracies’ (countries that 
democratised between the 1970s and 1990s). A Latin American framework for Internet studies, 
and particularly the political uses of online spaces, is slim but better developed. Social 
movements have attracted the lion’s share of this attention, perhaps because of the early global 
attention afforded to Mexican online social activism linked to offline political activity (Kahn 
and Keller, 2004, p. 87). In recent years, the strongest Latin America-focused work has 
examined social media and social protests during the ‘Chilean Winter’ of 2011 (Scherman, 
Arriagada, & Valenzuela, 2015; Valenzuela, 2013). One of the ambitions of this article, then, is 
to contribute to the underdeveloped literature on social media usage in Argentina, and third-
wave democracies, more broadly. We do this both by bringing Argentine social media usage 
into dialogue with the expansive literature on social media in Russia, and employing a 
comparative approach of our own.  
Data collection and Results 
We collected data for a range of search terms related to Alberto Nisman and Boris Nemtsov. 
For Nisman we launched collection on Monday 19 January, the day after his death; Nemtsov 
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was killed on 27 February 2015, and we started data collection the next morning. The Twitter 
Search API allows collection of tweets posted in the last seven days (Twitter Developers, 
2015). Upon its first iteration the script collected all available content. Subsequent iterations 
took place every fifteen minutes, searching for any new content. This collection process means 
some content posted in the first hours after each event will have been deleted before collection. 
Statistics for the number of favourites and retweets will also be higher for tweets in circulation 
for longer before collection. In order to account for these discrepancies, we collected up-to date 
information about retweet and favourite counts in late May 2015. At this point we also noted 
which tweets and user profiles had been deleted since our initial trawl.  
 
In order to test whether Twitter facilitates accidental exposure to politically charged subjects in 
Argentina and Russia, we limited our analysis to the Twitter conversation in the Russian 
language around the Cyrillic Nemtsov hashtag, and Spanish language tweets including the 
Nisman hashtag.
4
 This yielded 94,774 tweets about #Nemtsov and 224,532 about #Nisman. 
Selecting tweets by hashtags returns a relatively thin slice of the relevant tweets.
5
 As a result, 
our view of the data is partial and imperfect, and the generalisations below should be treated 
with some caution. Nonetheless, comparing the Argentine and Russian dataset reveals at least 
three areas where usage is markedly divergent: volume, artifice, and identity.  
 
Attentiveness to volume allows us to track participation size in comparison with both the 
national population overall and social media users in particular. Yet, not all Tweets are equal: 
checking for artifice - full or partial automation - helps elucidate how much of the content 
around our hashtags was human-produced, resulting directly from the rational and emotional 
thought processes of individuals. Finally, a focus on the constructed identities of active Twitter 
handles whose feed content appeared non-automated or not predominantly automated allows us 
to probe both the dominant characteristics of the groups and individuals who participated in the 
conversations and the extent to which they were willing to reveal facets of their offline 
identities as they contributed to online deliberation. Did Twitter function as an environment in 
which participants elected to be identifiable? Or, were desires for recognition arbitrated, with 
contributors choosing to use pseudonyms and generic avatars - constructed online identities - 
alone? Following Ausserhofer and Maireder (2013), we engage in this identificatory analysis in 
an effort to understand the types of accounts that formed the central tenet of the political 
conversations studied here. 
 
Volume  
We find three times more content generated around #Nisman than about #Nemtsov. The fact 
that Spanish-speakers wrote more about #Nisman than Russian-speakers did about #Nemtsov 
was apparent even when collecting the data: people were Tweeting about Nisman at a greater 
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rate than we could capture using Twitter’s Search API, an additional reason why we opted to 
archive only tweets with the Nisman hashtag. Two months later, when collecting data about 
Nemtsov, we were able to collect all tweets mentioning his name, both in English and Russian, 
with or without a hashtag.  
 
This discrepancy is not restricted to content creation, but also to user engagement, as measured 
by the mean number of times each tweet is retweeted or favourited by other users.  Tweets 
about #Nisman were on average retweeted twice as often and favourited three times as often as 
were those about #Nemtsov. We find a similar ratio if we contrast the proportion of tweets 
directed at (@) other users: 10% of tweets about #Nemtsov, compared to 16% about #Nisman.  
 
If tweets directed at other users are taken as a proxy for active conversation, it is tempting to 
map who talks to whom. However useful network visualizations may or may not be for social 
media analysis, in our case they revealed a large cluster of users active about #Nisman (42,761), 
but very few (862) in the case of #Nemtsov. Again, this points not only to more content, but 
also a more active conversation in Argentina than Russia. 
 
Identity 
We graded the three hundred users whose posts about the respective hashtags had the highest 
average number of retweets to determine both gender and whether the account was linked with 
a ‘real world’ identity. We filed spoof, parody, and humorous accounts in a separate category, 
and labelled accounts that purported to represent a group or an interest accordingly. We also 
identified media outlets separately. Finally, we labelled accounts that present as individuals into 
one of two categories: ‘real name’ or ‘pseudonym’. Accounts that had two of the following 
characteristics were labelled as ‘real name’: a plausible surname, a plausible profile picture, a 
specific and plausible biographical description, and links to other social media accounts or a 
personal website.
6
  
 
For Russia, we found 29% were female, compared to 27% for Argentina; in a similar study 
Ausserhofer and Maireder (2013, p. 99)  found 20% of core Austrian Twitter users were female. 
These figures are broadly comparable. The similarity does not, however, hold for user identity: 
76% of Argentine core users were identifiable as individuals, which is similar to the Austrian 
results, but wholly different from Russia (36%). 
 
 deleted group media pseudony
m 
real name spoof 
Nemtsov 3 19 15 105 102 56 
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Nisman 4 18 13 35 226 4 
Table 1: Identity of top 300 users who tweeted about Nemtsov and Nisman (excluding fake 
accounts) 
 
In Russia pseudonymous accounts are more common than real name ones; there is also a high 
proportion of joke or spoof accounts. Based on these data, we conclude that the top-end of the 
Argentine Twittersphere is a real name environment, whereas the same cannot be said for 
Russia. This discrepancy highlights that the Russian Twittersphere operates differently to that 
of Argentina. It is not just a case of a lower volume and lower engagement, but an environment 
in which individuals are much less willing to own their words.  
 
Artifice 
When we first collected the Russian data we noted that the vast majority of content was spam, 
obviously automated, or emanated from accounts that, for a range of reasons, bore patterns 
pointing to automation in use, creation, or both. Twitter’s rules allow some forms of 
automation, e.g. for customer service queries. However, it explicitly prohibits the posting of 
links that redirect through ad pages; automatically tweet to trending topics; users operating 
multiple accounts; automated replies, retweeting and mentions, automated following and 
unfollowing; and a myriad different types of spamming (“The Twitter Rules”, 2015).  
 
Twitter estimates that about 5% of its accounts are fake; researchers at Barracuda labs estimate 
the percentage is twice that (Wagstaff, 2015). Looking at the Russian Twittersphere, though, we 
are confident the true percentage is higher still. We identified large numbers of accounts that 
were obviously operated and or created using automation, and that broke the terms summarised 
above.
7
 For this analysis we divided accounts into ones that are probably bots and ones 
probably not. Yet, levels of automation exist on a spectrum, from automatically created, 
populated, and operated accounts to those merely boosted through automation, e.g. by 
simulating a large following (amassing followers) or a large readership (as signalled by 
automated retweets or favourites).  
 
To identify fake accounts we looked for irregularities within the full extent of metadata about 
users and tweets provided by Twitter. We looked for non-random clustering of two variables to 
identify suspicious looking user clusters. We then cross-tabulated the results against other 
variables to remove any genuine accounts that coincidentally shared characteristics with the bot 
clusters. For instance, we found a large number of accounts created within in a few seconds of 
each other, all of which appeared to have usernames made according to a specific template, as 
well as roughly the same number of friends and followers. These accounts were labelled as 
                                               
7
 We discuss the diversity of these accounts in greater detail elsewhere: Forthcoming 
11 
bots.
8
 We also looked for patterns in material posted. If a large number of accounts positively 
identified as bots tweeted links to a particular spam site, other accounts tweeting the same 
message would also be flagged as fake. Finally, we ran a machine-learning algorithm to identify 
accounts that were the most similar to the ones flagged as bots. These we manually inspected, 
determining whether they were bot accounts or not. When in doubt, we erred on the side of 
caution, labelling accounts ‘real’. We ran a series of iterations of the algorithm to help weed out 
false positives and false negatives. 
 
This process revealed an incredible level of artifice in the Russian-language dataset: we 
estimate that 77% of the tweets originated from bot accounts, while 81% of accounts that 
tweeted about #Nemtsov were fake. In contrast, only 9% of tweets about #Nisman originated 
from fake accounts. Once we strip out automated or semi-automated content, there is virtually 
no debate left about #Nemtsov. Excluding fake content, we find the volume of tweets about 
#Nisman to be nine times larger than that about #Nemtsov.  
 
 
Figure 1: Volume of automated and authentic tweets about #Nemtsov and #Nisman for the first 90 days. 
In the Russian Twittersphere bot activity was slow off the mark, but from day three bot activity 
consistently outpaced content from genuine accounts (see Figure 1). While twitter activity 
surrounding Nisman had a long tail, Russian conversations about Nemtsov spiked and faded, as 
bot activity picked up. On 21 April opposition figures Aleksei Naval’ny and Dmitrii Gudkov 
claimed Ramzan Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen Republic, was protecting Ruslan Geremeyev, 
the individual suspected of ordering the assassination. Geremeyev later left the country, and the 
investigation hit a dead end (Bullough, 2015). One might expect this event to have sparked 
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renewed interest about #Nemtsov, but only bot activity spiked: of the 16,536 tweets using the 
Nemtsov hashtag on 21 April, all but 20 originated from bot accounts.  
 
The degree to which automated content muffled conversation is visible for the final spike, at 75 
days after Nemtsov’s murder, on 12 May 2015. This is the publication date for the 64-page 
report ‘Putin. War’, based on material compiled by Boris Nemtsov, and completed by 
opposition heavyweights Oleg Kashin and Il’ia Yashin. The evidence presented in the report, 
purporting to prove that Putin was conducting a covert war in Ukraine, was hotly debated, but 
not in tweets about #Nemtsov: all but 115 of 2317 tweets originated from accounts identified as 
bots. 
 
It would appear that Russian activists and liberal commentators have eschewed hashtag usage, 
possibly due to the high proportion of automated activity. The anti-corruption blogger Aleksei 
Navalny, for instance, wrote 24 tweets that mentioned Nemtsov, but only one of these used the 
Nemtsov hashtag. Our data suggest that a learning-process takes place: as a hashtag attracts 
automated content, authentic activity moves elsewhere. Perhaps established accounts, which 
already have a large, direct follower-base, have already learnt not to bother with hashtags.
9
 Two 
months later, after a period of consistent hashtag spamming, #Nemtsov no longer served a 
mobilising function. Much like offline media, where critical journalists are frequently forced to 
move from one outlet to another, Twitter hashtags are rapidly muffled and the conversation 
moves elsewhere.  
 
The Spanish-language Twittersphere following the death of Nisman looked markedly different 
to the Russian language Twittersphere after the murder of Nemtsov. We observed significantly 
less bot activity, and the bulk of automated content promoted and amplified the reach of 
material already available on Twitter or elsewhere. Most prominent on this list of amplified 
content was political messages, newspaper articles, and information about pro- and anti-
Kirchnerist rallies. Bot accounts also occasionally posted duplicated statements and links in 
quick succession, seemingly in an attempt to flood the hashtag with partisan messaging. 
Patterns in user metadata do not, however, provide evidence that the accounts generating this 
material were created in an orchestrated fashion. In contrast to #Nemtsov, #Nisman triggered 
minimal reply spamming or hashtag flooding. Some of the bot activity involved hijacking 
Nisman-related hashtags for non-political ends, with marketers seeking to commandeer these 
top hashtags to increase their product visibility. As for #Nemtsov, we observe automated or 
semi-automated accounts that pose as grassroots supporters, but the numbers involved are 
vastly lower. There were no attempts that we could find that might have had the effect of 
blocking the hashtag, or limiting the spread of ideas and opinions.  
                                               
9
 Were we, then, wrong to select tweets based on including a hashtag? Ideally, more data would be better. We 
examined tweets about Nemtsov without a hashtag and found the proportion of automated activity was marginally 
lower, but still at least five times higher than for #Nisman.  
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Supporters of Fernández discussed the Nisman case in ways that almost entirely elided use of 
his name, terming it a provocation designed to besmirch the government. They chose exit over 
voice. This fact is in itself curious: while the space around #Nemtsov is polluted by apolitical 
spam and various forms of trolling, that around #Nisman is largely free from intervention. As a 
result, the feel of the content we collected is markedly different: for #Nisman we observe a 
largely uniform, oppositional message. For #Nemtsov, once we strip away the most egregious 
automation, we are left with cyber-battles, as warriors - be they pro- or anti-Kremlin - compete 
to dominate the space.  
 
The degree of artifice observed in the Russian conversation prompts the question of whether 
automation has the effect of displacing authentic activity. And what is Twitter doing to stamp 
out spam? Revisiting our data in June 2015, we found many accounts had been deleted since 
our initial trawls in January-March. Most of the suspended accounts were ones we had 
previously identified as bots. For Nisman, 80% of deleted tweets originated from accounts 
identified as bots. And of the content we had identified as fake, Twitter had removed 75%. In 
Russia, though, we see a different pattern: 92% of the deleted content was created by accounts 
we had identified as bots, but only 15% of the accounts we found had been suspended by 
Twitter. Thus the identification of fake accounts is quite accurate both for Russian and Spanish 
language content, but for accounts tweeting in Russian the purge was much less extensive.  
 
We suspect one reason for this discrepancy is that Russian bots are more sophisticated than the 
Argentine ones. It is easy to ban accounts that spout torrents of irrelevant or abusive content; 
banning numerous accounts that tweet sporadically is much harder. And within the data about 
Nemtsov we identified 20,150 bot accounts that only once tweeted about #Nemtsov. Most of 
the bots that tweeted about Nisman, on the other hand, tweeted streams of duplicated or near 
duplicated content.  
 
The sheer volume of fake content in itself poses a challenge for moderators. Russian opposition 
activists complain that hordes of pro-government trolls systematically report Facebook and 
Twitter posts for containing abusive content, resulting in time-wasting, content embargoes, and 
account suspensions. The blogger Anton Nossik (2015) complained that an army of cyber 
warriors ‘around the clock place deceitful denunciations against users on their “black list”’. His 
Facebook posts were reported as containing nudity, violence, or child pornography. Any 
organized campaign can overawe a structure ill-equipped to police Cyrillic posts; it must be 
especially difficult for moderators to determine which accounts are real and which fake if pro- 
and anti-Kremlin activists repeatedly denounce each other.  
 
We expected our comparison of Twitter discourses surrounding these political deaths to reveal 
similarities; we found mainly differences. This divergence suggests pre-existing state-media 
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relations shape the online conversation more decisively than does the fabric of networked 
communication, or indeed Twitter's rules and structures. In Russia, opposition and independent 
voices are, through a range of means, pushed to the margins of the media landscape; in 
Argentina, jostling between powerful media outlets and the state has created a highly polarized 
public sphere.   
 
Current state-media tensions in both countries emerge from complex recent histories. The 
formal re-democratization of Argentina (1983) introduced press freedoms, though a small 
number of media outlets with ties to the regime continued to dominate (Macrory, 2013, p. 181). 
Tensions between the media and the state deepened following the introduction of anti-
monopolization legislature in 2009. The law coincided with a high-profile fall-out between the 
owners of the Grupo Clarín media conglomerate, the Herrera de Noble family, and Fernández 
(Macrory, 2013, p. 182). Its implementation thus sparked rumours that the president was 
carrying out a latent alternative agenda. This climate of polarization extends onto Twitter, 
where our data suggests that Kirchnerists do not shut down opposition discourse, but also do 
not engage with it; not even naming Nisman, they appear instead to use wholly different 
framing references. 
 
The Russian media transitioned from state-control in Soviet times, to oligarchic control in the 
1990s. Putin's presidency saw the re-establishment of central control over both terrestrial 
television stations and the main print outlets. By 2012 Russia held a Freedom House rating of 
172nd, tied with Zimbabwe and Azerbaijan (“Sotseti i blogi podniali,” 2012). Since the Russian 
elections of 2011 and 2012, the most popular online media, social media, and social-networking 
sites in Russia have been placed under control of oligarchs loyal to the Kremlin. Individuals and 
media outlets have been targeted by anti-corruption litigation, or intimidated through costly 
libel suits. As a result, dissenting voices are rare, and often on the move between publications. 
The dilution and deletion of political content in the Russian Twittersphere suggests an 
extension of these practices, in forms effective for the Twitter environment, as news and 
opinion has begun to circulate in online spaces. 
 
Conclusions 
The big question that pervades debate between techno-optimists and their detractors is whether 
social media are good for democracy. Do they help to produce or accelerate democratic change 
or, alternatively, might they hinder it? Our data do not resolve this question, but they do push us 
to consider whether the premise may be wrong: social networking applications may not fulfil a 
single political function. Their functionality may be mediated instead by language and by pre-
existing relationships between the state and offline domestic media. Twitter may be ecumenical 
in its reach, but its local functions appear, in the cases we have studied, to be contingent on 
domestic factors. 
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Language-environments on Twitter exist largely in parallel, and impediments to discussion may 
vary widely from one to another. The degree to which Twitter is able to moderate different 
language environments introduces variation into how Twitter is used for political purposes. For 
our selection of data regarding Argentina we frequently see users amplifying offline messages, 
or using discourse online first that subsequently migrates offline. Twitter may, then, help extend 
the reach of political deliberation in Argentina. The space around #Nemtsov, by contrast, is 
dominated by a stream of junk content that muffles or at least displaces conversation. This 
intervention does not strip the Russian Twittersphere of political conversation, but it does mean 
that it is a dynamic source of information primarily for those already in the know: Russians who 
know who to follow can freely and easily access politically explosive content. The same, 
though, is true offline and (largely) elsewhere on the Internet. Conversely, politically 
disengaged individuals are not much more likely to stumble across oppositional content on 
Twitter than elsewhere. In this respect, Twitter cannot be said to play a particularly politicizing 
function in Russia. Moreover, whatever organizations and groups are responsible for polluting 
the Russian Twittersphere, the effect of automation is to undermine precisely those aspects of 
the network most likely to facilitate accidental exposure to cross-cutting information. 
 
The Russian-language and Spanish-language environments that we explore here clearly 
coincide in owing much to pre-established national media environments. Twitter behaviours 
differ from the one environment to the other precisely because of this common consistency with 
localized precedents. The divergences in the political functions of Twitter in Argentina and 
Russia point, moreover, towards a further research question regarding online-offline interaction. 
Much has been made of the organizing potential of social media. In Argentina, protests often 
draw tens of thousands of participants, suggesting their continued popularity over active online 
participation. At the same time, although Twitter and Facebook are heavily engaged for 
organizing, estimates of participation in recent protests do not tend to outstrip pre-Twitter 
participant figures. Up to half a million Argentine citizens, some of whom use Twitter, are 
believed to have attended the anti-Kirchner administration rallies of 2012, but this striking 
figure is no greater than estimates for the pre-Twitter age protests against the political 
establishment during the financial crisis of 2001 to 2002. Contrastingly, in 2011-12, at the peak 
of techno-optimism, Russia saw 100,000 protesters take to the streets - the largest number since 
perestroika (1986-91). Any theory of offline mobilisation via online galvanization must, then, 
account for these kinds of variation across language environment and regime type.  
  
A recent study suggests the criticality of Twitter as a ‘medium of expression and 
communication’ for those who are ‘especially interested in politics’ (Jamal, Keohane, Romney, 
& Tingley, 2015, pp. 56-7). Our research suggests some caveats to this broad claim. While it is 
clear that Twitter became an outlet for political expression following the deaths of Nemtsov and 
Nisman, we would be hard pressed to suggest that in either country those deliberations took on 
newly expansive forms, in terms of discursive content or key participants, as they circulated on 
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Twitter. The variation in the methods engaged for undermining or avoiding debate in Russia 
and Argentina highlights the importance of looking beyond English-language content as we 
seek to understand the political affordances of Twitter. Overarching theories based 
predominantly on English-language sources risk missing the complex internal variety that 
characterises the political content and uses of the Twittersphere, and thus the protean range of 
effects that it might exercise on offline politics.  
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